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Disaster and (im)mobility: 
Restoring mobility in Gojal after the Attabad landslide
A visual essay
Martin Sökefeld
Very often, disasters set people in motion. Volcano outbreaks, floods or earth-
quakes destroy the homes and livelihood of people and often leave them with lit-
tle choice but to flee the site of disaster. While many of the affected people move 
out, agents of humanitarianism rush in. In some cases, however, people cannot 
move to safer places because the required infrastructure has been destroyed, 
too. The destruction of infrastructure may be long-lasting, resulting in an ongo-
ing obstruction of mobility. This article details such a case. It deals with a disaster 
that suddenly trapped highly mobile people in their area and tells how mobility 
was restored but remained precarious nevertheless.
Introduction
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On the morning of January 4, 2010, the Hunza valley in Northern Pakistan was 
hit by an extraordinary landslide: The whole flank of a mountain broke off and, 
together with half of the village Attabad, rushed down the steep slope. An im-
mense mass of rubble and boulders filled the valley. The blockade created by the 
rockslide is more than a kilometer wide. This huge mass blocked the flow of the 
Hunza River and buried the Karakorum Highway (KKH), the only road leading from 
Pakistan into the upstream area of Gojal (Upper Hunza).
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While mobility has increasingly become a focus of social theory, I am of the opin-
ion that it cannot be fully understood without considering its opposite, immobil-
ity. Mobility is a synecdoche for the dynamics of contemporary society and it can 
be understood both literally, as physical movement, travel and migration, and 
metaphorically, as social movement and mobilization. Mobility has become the 
normality of life. While most of the time it is simply taken for granted, the central-
ity of mobility in social life becomes visible when it is suddenly interrupted. Yet 
even then people do not simply “freeze” but take great efforts to overcome the 
state of motionlessness. Paradoxically, immobility mobilizes people, both liter-
ally and metaphorically. This is also the case with the Attabad landslide. Thus, a 
period of immobility may be a trigger for significant social dynamics and change. 
In this article I describe the consequences of the sudden immobility created by 
the landslide for the people of Gojal, the efforts to restore movement and the 
creation of a new traffic system. I am doing this only in part by a written text. 
In addition, I rely on visual representation through photographs which capture 
the environment created by the landslide much better than words. In this ar-
ticle, visual representation of the disaster focuses on the boats brought to the 
lake. Before the landslide, there have never been such boats in area. In my own 
perception and experience the boats became the symbol of the disaster of being 
trapped in the mountains, of the precariousness of connection and of the peo-
ple’s struggle to regain mobility.
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While I had come to Gojal for the first time during fieldwork for my PhD thesis 
in Gilgit between 1991 and 1993, I visited the area for the first time after the 
landslide in November 2010. I still remember vividly how I crossed the debris and 
caught a glimpse of the lake for the first time. I was struck by the lucid blue-green 
color of the water, such a stark contrast to the normal grey of the Hunza-River 
which is due to its heavy load of silt from the glaciers. During all my visits I felt 
a stark contradiction between the visual beauty of the lake, especially on sunny 
days, and the destruction it had brought.  Since my first visit I have travelled to 
Gojal once or twice every year and followed the unfolding of events especially in 
the village of Gulmit. The focus of my research has largely been on the political 
consequences of the disaster as it has engendered unprecedented mobilization 
of protest in Gojal (Sökefeld 2012). This protest was directly connected with the 
issue of (im)mobility: People demanded the reconnection of their area and pro-
tested against what they perceived as insufficient action undertaken by the gov-
ernment in this regard. The present text, however, focuses more on movement in 
the literal, physical sense. In local perception, disconnection and immobility is not 
simply the consequence of the disaster, it is the disaster.
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Mobile Gojal
Gojal is a sub-district of Hunza-Nager district in Gilgit-Baltistan, the high-moun-
tain area in Northern Pakistan. Villages are situated between 2.400 and 3.000 m 
above sea-level and many of the surrounding peaks reach beyond 7.000 m. The 
inhabitants of Gojal belong to three ethno-linguistic groups. Wakhi is the most 
widely spoken language, followed by Burushaski and a tiny Domaaki minority. All 
groups are affiliated with the Ismaili branch of Islam which is headed by the Aga 
Khan.
While people living in high-mountains are often described as being “isolat-
ed” and rather “cut-off” from the rest of the world, this was absolutely not the 
case with Gojal. Even long before the age of modern road construction the peo-
ple from Hunza were well known for their quick movement and extended raids, 
mainly into the Kirghiz areas of what is today the Chinese province of Xinjiang. 
While the people have never been simply “stuck in the mountains”, mobility grew 
exponentially after the completion of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) in 1978. The 
KKH links Pakistan with China. It became a busy trade-route and helped much to 
integrate Hunza and the whole of Gilgit-Baltistan economically into Pakistan.
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Gojal is the last Pakistani area before the KKH enters China over the Khunjerab-
Pass, at an altitude of 4.700m. In the village Sost Gojal houses a dry-port where 
goods from China and from Pakistan are reloaded, stored and exchanged. For 
many people from Gojal, the KKH was the route of migration to down-country 
Pakistan in search of education or employment (Benz 2013). After more than 
thirty years, many Gojali families have become multi-local. They have branched 
out spatially, with significant parts being settled in Gilgit, the capital of Gilgit-
Baltistan, or in the big cities of Pakistan, especially in Karachi and Islamabad. Indi-
viduals move frequently between the sections of their families that are located in 
different cities. However, the KKH was not only important for movement between 
Gojal and Pakistan, but also for mobility within Gilgit-Baltistan. Many goods and 
services are available in Gilgit city only, or require at least a visit to Aliabad, the 
center of Hunza. Life in Gojal was to a great extent synonymous with moving or 
“wayfaring” (Ingold 2009) along the KKH.
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Compared with the large-scale disasters which Pakistan saw in recent years – like 
the earthquake of October 2005 with more than 80.000 victims – the Attabad 
landslide was only a minor disaster. It claimed the lives of nineteen inhabitants of 
the village. Its consequences, however, did not only affect Attabad village but the 
whole population of the upstream area of Gojal (Upper Hunza), around 20.000 
people.  
Disaster research distinguishes between “slow onset” and “quick onset” di-
sasters. The Attabad landslide combined both types. The village of Attabad was 
hit by a quick onset disaster which in a few minutes destroyed half of the village, 
its terraces, fields and orchards. Also the road was destroyed in this sudden mo-
ment of disaster. Yet the landslide also blocked the flow of the river and created a 
lake that grew continuously over the following six months until the water spilled 
over the crest of the debris. By then the water had inundated one village, Ayeen-
abad, completely. Considerable parts of two more villages, Shishkat and Gulmit, 
had also gone under water, while a few houses each were affected in Ghulkin and 
in Husseini. In addition, bazaars, fields and orchards were inundated.
The initial phase of the disaster
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Gojal has probably never been self-sufficient in terms of food – most mountain 
communities rely on a mixture of economic strategies for survival, including trade. 
With easy mobility on the KKH, exchange with and dependency on “the outside” 
– especially “down-country” Pakistan – had increased. Taking advantage of their 
very high level of education which is facilitated by the strong commitment of the 
Aga Khan Development Network in the area, many people from Gojal have found 
employment with NGOs in Hunza, Gilgit, or even beyond. But also those who con-
tinued agriculture did not produce in the first place for their own consumption 
but for the market. In the last decades Gojal had become a prime area for the 
production of seed potatoes which were sold to the markets of the Punjab.
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When people from the upstream area saw the dimension of the landslide, they 
immediately realized that their area would be cut-off from Pakistan and from the 
flow of supplies for a longer time. A food crisis was imminent. People rushed to 
the shops in their villages and stored provisions. But the shops were soon emp-
tied. In the first days after the landslide, Gojal was indeed cut off. Because the 
border-post on the Khunjerab-Pass is generally closed from December to May, 
there was also no exit to China at that time. Moving stories tell how in this time 
people shared wheat flour needed for their staple bread because their neighbors 
had ran out of stock. These are examples for the disaster communitas that often 
characterizes calamity-hit areas immediately after the impact. Post-disaster altru-
ism, however, quickly gives way to the “normal” state of affairs, and especially the 
arrival of relief goods generally causes competition and conflict over the distribu-
tion of such goods.
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In Gojal, however, there was no relief for the time being. In the first weeks it was 
possible to climb over the mound of debris but this was a hazardous undertaking 
and it was not possible to carry larger quantities of supplies over the blockade. In 
early February, when the water started to submerge Ayeenabad village, the KKH 
between the village and the blockade was flooded and it was no longer possible 
to reach the barrier by road or even on foot as in this section perpendicular cliffs 
of solid rock rise out of the water. The water level was increasing by more than 
0.5 meters per day.
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Gojal could only be reached by the helicopters of the Pakistan Army and the Na-
tional Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), but due to adverse weather con-
ditions sorties were often suspended for several consecutive days. Stories about 
the helicopters tell about the growing alienation between “the people” and “the 
government”: People complained that they often had to stay behind because 
some important officers “wanted to have a look”. In any case, the limited helicop-
ter services were utterly insufficient to supply the population of Gojal with food 
and other necessary goods. In this time, a food crisis was imminent. In order to 
point out the gravity of the situation, the coordinator of the World Food Program 
(WFP) for Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir who happened to be from Gojal him-
self, told me later that “the people started to eat their own potatoes.” In the local 
conception, potatoes are not considered as staple food but only as sabzi (vegeta-
ble): Sabzi alone does not fill the stomach but wheat which is needed for all kinds 
of bread, the staple food, was getting short because the local farmers produced 
mostly potatoes for export and people were used to buy cheap, subsidized wheat 
flour from the shops.
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In mid-February the NDMA brought some boats to the lake for the transport of 
people. There have never been any boats in the area before. But these boats were 
old, leaky and unsafe, and soon they were defunct. In March traders who were 
eager to resume transport because they still had goods stored in the Sost dry-
port, launched larger wooden boats. These boats mainly carried goods but also 
took passengers. The Frontier Works Organization (FWO), an army engineering 
corps, had started to dig a spillway through the debris and also built a provisional 
access road, literally a “dirt road” across the barrier down to the KKH. Slowly, a 
new way of travel and transport developed: Because the road across the block-
ade was steep and very bad, trucks could not reach the shore of the growing lake. 
Thus, goods arriving by boat had to be loaded on tractors or jeeps that carried 
them across the debris down to the KKH where they were loaded onto the trucks 
for further transport to down-country Pakistan.
Moving Boats
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The boats were initially brought from the Tarbela-Lake, the large reservoir further 
down on the River Indus, and owned by non-Gojali traders. The boats are fitted 
with two outboard engines and propellers, one on each side. They are manned 
with a “captain” who steers and who is mostly also from the Tarbela region, and a 
helper who starts the engine and collects the fees from the passengers. Over the 
years, the people got used to the boat service and a new travel routine was es-
tablished. In the first year, boat traffic was tremendous as many goods from China 
were still stored in the Sost dry-port. On the way down, passengers often had to 
sit on top of the cargo for want of other space. As much less goods are exported 
from Pakistan to China than in the opposite direction, boats are often empty on 
the way up which was consequentially much more comfortable. Because the KKH 
did not only connect Gojal with the outside but served also as connection be-
tween the villages of Gojal, also travel within the region was affected.
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After the boats came also relief in the form of food aid: In autumn 2010 the World 
Food Program brought flour, rice, and other items sufficient to feed the whole 
population of Gojal for two months across the lake. More aid, however, came 
from the opposite direction: China provided food for about eight months and 
repeated this aid in the years 2011 and 2013.
Travel and transport by boat is arduous, costly and prolongs the journey to 
Central Hunza, Gilgit and beyond. It is especially difficult for old people and for 
patients, including emergency cases, who have to take the boats as there is no 
doctor in Gojal. In every winter, the lake froze for several weeks. During these 
weeks Gojal was completely cut off again. Also when the lake is not completely 
frozen, strong winds that prevail in winter in the valley often make the journey 
dangerous or even outright impossible. Several patients lost their lives because 
they could not reach a hospital in time.
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Transport of goods became very expensive as cargo had to be reloaded several 
times. This gravely affected agriculture in Gojal. Because the transport of pota-
toes became so expensive, traders offered local farmers only very much reduced 
rates for their produce. Often, farmers were offered only one third of the rate 
they had received before the landslide. In autumn 2010, many sacks of potatoes 
were shipped across the lake. Recognizing, however, that potato farming was not 
remunerative anymore as the returns did not even cover the expenses for fer-
tilizer and diesel for the tractors, most families gave up potato farming in the 
following years. Many reverted to wheat cultivation for their own subsistence 
or left their fields fallow. Thus, the landslide and the blockade of the road had 
significant economic consequences for the people of Gojal: Prices for “imported” 
goods soared while the income of most families was very much reduced. This had 
severe implications for education: Many families were unable to pay the school or 
university fees for their children. Many local schools are organized by the people 
themselves and draw all their revenue from the students’ fees. These schools 
now lacked the funds to pay the teachers. In spite of a one-time government sub-
sidy the whole system seemed to be jeopardized. Because of the great value that 
is put on education the greatest worry was thus that the landslide endangered 
the people’s future.
Economic Crisis
202
Sökefeld   Disaster and (im)mobility
But the lake also brought new economic opportunities. Many men started to 
work as porters at the boat-stands at both ends of the lake and especially in the 
first years they were able to make good money there. Work is self-organized. 
Workers are grouped in parties the members of which mostly derive from the 
same village or at least the same area. A munshi (“writer”) has to take care of the 
equal distribution of work to the parties. Beside men from Gojal especially men 
from adjacent Nager do these jobs as the southern end of the lake is close to this 
area.  Initially, Nagerkuts worked at both ends of the lake.
In summer 2011 a dispute about the distribution of cargo work between 
parties from Gojal and from Nager at the northern end of the lake, which at that 
time was near the Gojali village of Hussaini, escalated to a fight. Many transport 
contractors are from Nager and the Gojali workers had the impression that the 
contractors favored the laborers from Nager, giving them more jobs than the Go-
jalis. Both parties called for help and more Nagerkuts (people from Nager) rushed 
across the lake to support their fellows. In the fight, a few nearby houses were at-
tacked and damaged. They were stopped only by the intervention of Shia imams 
from Nager. After that, workers were strictly separated and men from Nager re-
mained at the southern end of the lake while only Gojalis worked at its northern 
shore.
Disaster economy: Opportunities and conflicts
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Other economic opportunities were taken up by the boat owners and the cap-
tains. Initially all of them were from outside the region, but in 2011 some local 
people pooled resources and had their own boats built. Yet the boat business 
was quite risky and many boats were destroyed in winter when the lake froze, 
resulting in heavy losses for some of the owners. Further, at both ends of the lake 
small make-shift bazaars developed, with little restaurants, shops and diesel sell-
ers catering for the needs of workers and travelers. While the southern end of the 
lake, at the spillway, remained fixed, the northern end shifted according to the 
length of the lake. Initially, the lake, measuring more than twenty-five kilometers 
in length, reached up to the village of Hussaini and the boat-stand was located 
there. All the tributaries of the Hunza-River come from glaciers and carry a huge 
load of sand and silt with them which quickly filled the lake between Gulmit and 
Hussaini. In addition, the water level was lowered in consequence of the FWO’s 
efforts to dig the spillway.
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Thus, the northern end of the lake moved consecutively southwards as did the 
boat-stand. Since winter 2012/13 it was located at the southern end of Gulmit, 
just opposite Shishkat, where before 2010 a bridge across the river had connected 
the two villages. At my last visit in March 2014, the lake had moved even further 
south and did not even properly reach Gulmit anymore. Sand has been banked up 
there in order to enable access to the boats. But because in winter this particular 
spot is regularly hit by avalanches, it was closed for passengers and only heavy 
goods were allowed for loading and unloading there. Passengers had to disem-
bark the boats at Shishkat on the lake’s opposite bank. In order to reach Gulmit 
and the rest of Gojal, one had to cross the quite vast area of the village, to climb 
down to the river at its other side where a small and shaky wooden foot-bridge 
had been constructed in order to cross the river to the Gulmit side. From there 
it was still half an hour walk to reach Gulmit village. Thus, travel had become 
once more time-consuming and troublesome, especially if one carried loads and 
luggage – or much more expensive if one was lucky enough to catch a jeep or a 
tractor that carried one across Shishkat and, from the other side of the bridge, 
further on to Gulmit. In addition, this arrangement was not very safe as the bridge 
had already been washed away once, only a few days after its construction. Thus, 
people almost constantly had to adjust to new routines of travel.
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Although the southern end of the lake remained fixed, the spillway changed its 
character considerably over the years. Most importantly, the access road across 
the barrier was extended and improved and since summer 2013 trucks and heavy 
machinery could directly reach the shore of the lake. 
Efforts to drain the lake completely remained inefficient and the water-level 
could not be reduced sufficiently to bring the KKH completely out of the water 
again. Especially the Chinese government was highly interested in re-aligning the 
KKH because the highway is a significant link between Western China and the 
Pakistani deep-sea port at Gwadar in Baluchistan. Also Gwadar Port had been 
constructed by China in order to facilitate Chinese exports. In January 2012 an 
agreement was signed for the realignment of the KKH through the construction 
of three tunnels between the spillway and Ayeenabad village over a length of 
altogether seven kilometers. Being mostly funded by Chinese loans the project 
was given to the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). Works started in 
Summer 2012 and progress at a very high pace. At the time of writing in spring 
2014, the digging of two of the tunnels was completed and the third one was well 
underway. Completion of the realignment of the KKH, including the completion 
of a new bridge between the villages of Gulmit and Shishkat, is expected for late 
2015 or early 2016. 
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While the focus of this article is the obstruction and reconstruction of mobility from 
Gojal to Pakistan and within Gojal, also another kind of short distance mobility has to be 
mentioned that has been induced by the disaster. This concerns the Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs). Since the Swat crisis of 2008 and 2009, when the battles between the 
Pakistani army and the Taliban over the Swat valley displaced around two million people 
from their area, “IDPs” has become a an often used concept in Pakistan. In the context 
of the Attabad disaster, those persons are categorized as IDPs who have lost their homes 
to the lake. This concerns altogether about 450 households. They were displaced in dif-
ferent ways: While those from the villages of Attabad, Ayeenabad and Shishkat moved to 
preliminary shelters in two camps in Central Hunza because no safe land was available 
in these places, those from Gulmit did not have to leave their village but were accom-
modated by their own relatives. The IDPs  received small aid packages from different 
NGOs. In 2011, government paid a compensation of 600.000 PKR (ca. 4.800 Euro) per 
household. In addition, they received a larger share of the food relief provided by the 
Chinese government. 
Initially for the purpose of getting government compensation, the IDPs formed a 
committee which is now generally representing the IDPs interests. In contrast to the IDPs 
from the other villages those in Gulmit are now resettled in new houses. Many other 
inhabitants of Gulmit resent very much that the IDPs still claim “IDP-status” and success-
fully fought for the lion’s share of China’s food aid in 2013. 
The opposition of IDPs versus non-IDPs is now a pervasive feature of village society. 
In a certain respect, the IDPs became a new social category. 
Displacement – another movement
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The Attabad landslide brought movement out of Gojal to a sudden halt. While only a few 
families were directly affected by the landslide, the entire population of the sub-district 
suffered from the disconnection and the ensuing economic crisis. Yet people did not re-
main immobile but struggled to reestablish connection and mobility. The years after the 
landslide were a period of hardship which deeply impacted social routines. However, 
also new techniques and routines were developed. The establishment of the boat-traffic 
across the lake brought new issues of social organization and conflict and, besides all dif-
ficulties, also new economic opportunities. Drawing also on other examples of disaster, 
it is safe to conclude that post-disaster periods are not only times of suffering but also of 
creativity and innovation. 
Given the speed with which the Chinese company and their sub-contractors are 
building the new road including tunnels and the bridge, it seems indeed possible that 
the gap in the KKH will be closed soon. During the boat-trip after my last visit in Gulmit 
in March 20141 the thought crossed my mind that this might have been my last boat-
journey across Attabad Lake as I will be able to return only more than a year later, when, 
possibly, the road will be realigned again. But even when the boats are gone, traces of 
the disaster will remain: in memory and narratives, and perhaps even in social structure.
1  Since 2010, fieldwork in Gojal took place within the framework of different projects funded by 
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and Ger-
man Academic Exchange Service. I am grateful to all these agencies for their generous funding.
Conclusion
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Captions of the photographs
P 2: The spillway in November 2010
P 3:  Watching the lake from the blockade
P 4:  Destroyed houses in Gulmit
P 7:  Starting the engine
P 9:  A wedding party leaving Gulmit by boat
P 10:  Sacks of potatoes at the spillway in November 2010
P 12:  Truck drivers seeking shelter behind cargo in January 2011
P 13:  The boat-stand at Hussaini just below the ice of Hussaini-Glacier in Janu-
ary 2011
P 14:  Ice on the lake in February 2012
P 15:  Loading tyres from China on a boat at Gulmit boat-stand in September 
2013
P 16:  The munshi distributing work
P 17:  The boat-stand at the spillway in September 2013
P 19:  Laborers awaiting a boat at the spillway
P 22:  Clouds of dust from the construction of the tunnels
Sketch-map of Gojal 
(not to scale) showing 
the lake at the time of 
its longest extension in 
summer 2010.
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